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Since these notes were written other and tremendous events have taken place. October 31 an armistice between Turkey and the Allies was signed at Mudros, on the Island of Lemnos, in the Ægean Sea. The Hohenzollerns, Hapsburgs, and Ottoman Turks are witnessing the death throes of their ancient empires and the dream of a Mitteleuropa is at an end. The war-sick world reads the news from Italy, France, Belgium, Serbia, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and breathes again the breath of free men unafraid. Nation after nation from out the depths of centuries of patient, persistent struggle are raising their glad hands toward the morning. Tumbling down the darkness crashes the ancient, discredited, despised remains of the world's arch fire-eater and swashbuckler—war.

A FATAL FLAW IN THE LEAGUE-OF-NATIONS SCHEMES

By GUSTAV SPILLER

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THE subject which in Entente circles is most unwearily discussed today, next to the one of satisfactorily ending the war, is certainly that of the desirability of establishing a League of Nations. Some hold that a vital condition of its success is the exclusion of Germany, at least for a number of years, whilst others contend that only the inclusion of Germany—of course a Germany whose autocracy has been superseded by a democracy—can ensure the League's object being realized. Agreement, however, is almost general that one of the preconditions of its soundness is the settlement of the nationalities' question. Among the Entente Powers the conviction is ripening that when peace comes to be seriously discussed, the carefully elaborated plan of a League of Nations must be ready to be deposited on the round table. M. Clemenceau, alone among Entente statesmen, was credited with eyeing suspiciously the idea of leaguings together the nations; but recently he appears to have explained that he had been misunderstood, and that he, too, believed that organized law should prevail internationally.

When we approach the consideration of the positive contents of the schemes proposed by more or less authoritative bodies or persons, they appear, to the present writer, to be dominated by the idea that the cardinal virtue of an acceptable scheme lies in its making no appreciable demands on the States to be invited to form the League. The propounders almost remind one of Shakespeare's *Dogberry*, who held that since he who touches pitch is certain to be defiled, therefore we must turn away from the law breaker in holy horror and with the gentlest of admonitions. Virtually, all the schemes contemplate a Court whose decisions may be ignored, and a Council of Conciliation whose advice may be disregarded with impunity. The only point on which definiteness has been reached, is that hostilities may not be begun until after the judgment or advice has been published, affording thus, it is alleged, an opportunity for

a calming of spirits and a dispassionate reconsideration of the issue. If, however, a constituent State should prove recalcitrant and refuse to wait, "those States that have the power must be ready to use all the force, economic, military, or naval, they possess." (Viscount Grey.)

It is this last aspect—of the perpetuation of militarism by the League of Nations—which concerns us in this article. Over and over again we are assured by distinguished personalities that it is as idle to think of dispensing with force in inter-national affairs as to dream that we could do without it in intra-national affairs. "The sanction that maintains law is the application of force with the support of the great majority of individuals behind it." (Grey.) Therefore, international law, it is argued, must of necessity be safeguarded by the sanction of force. "We cannot abolish war," says Mr. C. A. McCurdy, M. P., "any more than we can abolish murder; but we can treat it in the same way." As Theodore Roosevelt forcibly expresses this attitude: "When peace comes, let us accept any reasonable proposal, whether calling for a League of Nations, or for any other machinery, which we can in good faith act upon, and which really does offer some chance of lessening the number of future wars and of diminishing their area; but let us not forget that any promise that such a League or other machinery will definitely do away with war is either sheer nonsense or rank hypocrisy. Let us rest our strength on our army, which shall consist not of a special caste but of the people themselves—on an army produced by universal obligatory training of all our young men from 19 to 21."

Let us for a moment be "practical," and envisage the existence of such a militarist League *in the light of pre-war experience*. War remaining a possibility, nations will needs be compelled to maintain vast military establishments; and "if there is to be concentrated preparation for more war, the researches of science will be devoted henceforth to discovering methods by which the human race can be destroyed." (Grey.) Furthermore, uncertainty as to what other States are doing or contemplating, will render "intelligence departments" or espionage inevitable; and rumours, of colossal preparations or meditated attacks, well or ill based, will embitter the relations between States and precipitate crisis after crisis. Clearly, militarism as such creates the conditions favorable to war.

We may imagine this gloomy picture somewhat brightened by two reflections. The first is that since there are numerous States in our League, it would be foolhardy for one or two of the States composing it to defy them. Unfortunately, however, we know to our bitter cost that the crushing of the well-devised and conscienceless military machine of one country has already claimed from the world millions of precious lives and tens of thousands of millions in treasure. Are we, then, in our League, after smashing this brutal military machine, to commence preparations for holding in awe and in check a rejuvenated and unregenerate Germany, a task demanding perhaps twenty million soldiers and a mountain of wealth, to make a Croesus stagger? The second reflection, too, is as a golden apple to the hungry and thirsty. It is said that the League will arrange for a reduction in armaments. But reduction can only refer to quantity, whilst the many surprises of the war have

demonstrated that unless an armaments' limitation treaty were to be drastically revised quinquennially, its provisions would speedily become obsolete owing to novel inventions and unanticipated improvements.

It is possible that even if our lugubrious forebodings proved correct, matters would not be as hopeless and depressing as before the war, with a League such as we have outlined. Who in his heart, however, would not rebel against the suggestion that war, bloody and ruthless, perhaps bloodier and more ruthless than ever, *must* be accepted as an ever-present Damocles sword hanging over our children and our children's children? What statesman would dare to cheer his people with such a heart-sickening prospect?

The truth is that not a few of our "practical" thinkers are inclined to be blandished by superficial analogies. Viscount Grey admits that "the analogy between States and individuals, or groups of individuals, is not perfect." If he could afford the time in these harassing days to probe this analogy with his piercing intellect, he would find that he had pricked a bubble. The analogy, he would discover, is grossly and gravely misleading. "During one hundred and twenty years," the American *ADVOCATE OF PEACE* states in its July number, "the Supreme Court of the United States has handed down eighty-one decisions in cases between States, and in no instance has it employed force to hale a State before it, or to compel the observance of its decrees." And, to make the contrast complete the writer avers: "We all know that the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States against individuals can be and if necessary will be enforced by the police power, but we also know that decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are not and never have been enforced in any such way. . . . Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States does not even compel a State to appear before it."

This attitude towards States in a Union holds true of intra-territorial units generally. Great Britain, for example, contains thousands of such territorial units, some of them imposing as London and others extensive as Scotland, and yet the question of applying force to any of them (Ireland has never yet been properly assimilated), or their applying force to one another, has not even crossed the mind of the practical politician for generations. Assuredly, there is here a vital distinction, the consequences of which we cannot pursue here. Suffice it to add that the normal treatment of an individual offender in a civilized community is also almost infinitely superior to that meted out to a recalcitrant nation in war—especially in war as conceived by the German High Command. Territorial units can therefore be and are being governed without the menace or the application of force, and it should accordingly not pass the wit of man to devise a League of Nations which shall involve the complete eradication of militarism and armaments. It would be lamentable if the chances of a permanent peace were wrecked by a false analogy.

Here, as in almost all matters pertaining to internationalism, President Wilson has made a signally valuable contribution. He would, as I understand him, reduce the war establishments of every country to the preparations dictated by domestic or internal needs. This should mean, on the one hand, a slight strengthening of the existing police force along its own lines, and

on the other, the abolition of guns and other instruments of warfare, of fortresses, of the military hierarchy, of ministries of war, of soldiering or drilling—in short, of everything that renders war possible and effective. Then, when war has become but a sad memory, States will cease to suspect and lacerate each other and will be ready to co-operate in building the future City of the Light.

I appeal to my esteemed readers to combat the notion that there is a close analogy between individuals and territorial units, or that the carefully graduated and humane penalties of a civilized country even distantly resemble or suggest the anarchic savagery of warfare. Let us labor for a comprehensive League of Nations that shall disestablish war, liberate nationalities from alien control, and bless the world with a full-blooded international legislature, court, and administration.

DANGER IN POLITICO-ECONOMIC DOCTRINES ACCEPTED BY SIR EDWARD GRAY

By JACKSON H. RALSTON

THE much-discussed Lichnowsky memorandum has not, we believe, received the attention it deserves from one important point of view. We have been so very busy, with propriety, applauding the general position taken by Lichnowsky and the material light he has thrown upon the events immediately preceding the war, that we have neglected to observe that the memorandum reveals not alone the beneficent and pacific side of the character of Sir Edward Gray, but also the fact that Sir Edward still entertains, in certain respects, the archaic viewpoint of the average European public man as to the duties of the state in foreign affairs. Until the ideas tacitly accepted by him cease to control, wars will find their justification in attempts to command foreign markets.

The European conception, in its original sense, is stated by Von Jagow, the former German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in his comment upon the Lichnowsky memoir. He says "Even Prince Lichnowsky does not deny that we had there (in the Orient) great economic interests to represent; but today economic interests are no longer to be separated from political interests."

This represents the old, and, as we might have hoped, the dying conception. Its position is, first, get hold of a country through its economic interests, and next, control its political interests for the benefit of the economic. This has been the order of the day largely in the past—changed only when the sequence was reversed and political control was seized with the intent of using that control to develop economic profits.

Nevertheless, we find Sir Edward Gray and Prince Lichnowsky proceeding on behalf of their respective governments, to divide up parts of the world as the larger capitalistic interests of their respective countries might dictate, with the supreme thought in their minds that if a suitable division of economic control of the countries in question should be made, the chance of armed strife could proportionately be eliminated. This